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The present status of arms control in Europe
is somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, arms
control has experienced astounding successes over
the last ten years: the INF Treaty, START 1 and 2,
the Chemical Weapons Convention, the CFE 1 and
1a Treaties, as well as a wide range of confidence-
building measures. On the other hand, the impres-
sion has become redundant in the European context.
The presumed reason is that the Cold War has evapo-
rated which had provided the setting for arms con-
trol efforts ever since the 1940s, leaving arms con-
trol as 'a solution in search of a problem'. In the
present paper, however, a case shall be made for the
continuing relevance of arms control for the 'new
Europe', albeit with an emphasis that differs signifi-
cantly from that of the Cold War.
The Concept of Arms Control
Arms control was originally conceived as a
more realistic alternative to disarmament, in particu-
lar to the futile, perhaps even counter-productive and
harmful, quest for general and complete disarma-
ment. In the most sophisticated conceptions, arms
control was a means of achieving stability, i.e. war
prevention. As this had also become the foremost
goal of military planning (because of the suicidal
nature of nuclear war) arms control was regarded as
an integral component of, rather than the opposite
of, defence policy. Because the main goal of arms
control was stability, it was furthermore acknowl-
edged that it might sometimes require more rather
than fewer arms, even though it was, of course, de-
sirable to accomplish stability at the lowest possible
level of armaments. Thomas Schelling and Morton
Halperin thus used the term to denote
... all the forms of military cooperation be-
tween potential enemies in the interest of reducing
the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it oc-
curs, and the political and economic costs of prepar-
ing for it. ... an effort, by some kind of reciprocity or
cooperation with our potential enemies, to minimize,
to offset, to compensate or to deflate some of these
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characteristics of modem weapons and military ex-
pectations.
Behind this notion was a theory of crisis sta-
bility and instability, according to which there was a
significant risk of wars starting inadvertently, e.g.
via dynamics that International Relations theory as-
sociates with the 'security dilemma': One state might
erroneously come to believe that its opponent is about
to initiate (or even that it has already launched) an
attack, in which case the best chance of not losing
will be to 'beat him to it', i.e. to pre-empt the attack.
Conceivably, between two sides 'reciprocal fears of
surprise attack' might even result in a sequence of
pre-emption incentives which might produce a war
desired by neither side, and from which both sides
would stand to lose 'in a big way', regardless of who
would ultimately prevail.
Initially, arms control thinking was almost en-
tirely concerned with nuclear weapons and the rela-
tionship between the two superpowers. However, the
awareness gradually grew that the conventional realm
had to be taken into account. If this remained unstable,
in the sense that states (in particular the Soviet Union)
might possess war-winning options, there were limits
to how stable the nuclear realm could be made. War
had to be deterred by means of manipulated risks that
fighting might escalate out of control, which required
some instability at the higher ranks of the escalation
ladder. To thus pose a 'threat that leaves something to
chance' was what NATO's flexible response' strat-
egy was all about. By implication, in order to truly
render nuclear war inconceivable, the conventional
realm had to be stabilized, i.e. conventional war-win-
ning options had to be eliminated.
This was the purpose of the arms control-re-
lated ideas of non-offensive defence that flourished
in Europe, especially in Germany, in the 1980s. The
seminal proposals for a 'defensive defence', those
of Horst Afheldt and associates, were directly based
on the findings of nuclear arms control, i.e. the theory
of stable deterrence, from which the central criteria
of force design were (mutatis mutandis, of course)
transposed to conventional forces:
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* To pose of threats to the respective other side's
defensive ('second strike') capabilities was counter-
productive, as it would merely produce incentives
for pre-emptive attack whence a war might ensue.
* To remove even the impression of posing such
'threats required not merely amendments of politi-
cal intentions, military strategy and operational con-
cepts but also of capabilities, i.e. a force restructur-
ing to a defensive or non-offensive defence (NOD).
* That a dispersion of forces would make them less
susceptible to disarming attack ('first strike'), hence
would allow a state fearing an attack to wait until it
actually occurs before defending himself ('retaliat-
ing') rather than doing so in an 'anticipatory mode',
i.e. by pre-emption.
Arms Control and Defence
We have thus seen that, after a bumpy start,
the arms control endeavour thus eventually accom-
plished some noteworthy successes in the conclud-
ing phase of the Cold War. Even though it may not
have been a decisive factor in bringing this bipolar
confrontation to an end it certainly codified its
gradual disappearance. This raises the question
whether arms control has had its day, i.e. whether it
has been rendered obsolete for the post-Cold War
period. It would not be at all surprising if this were
so, as arms control was clearly conceived as a solu-
tion to, or a means of managing, a conflict that was
no longer relevant. It would, indeed, be a mere coin-
cidence if the same (set of) instruments(s) would be
relevant for a radically different setting.
New and Rekindled Conflicts
What is new about the post-Cold War Europe
is, first of all, that there is no longer any 'systemic
divide', neatly dividing the continent into opposing
(approximate) halves. Whether a new fault-line may
develop (or is already developing) is disputed, just
as is the question what might be the divisive issues:
civilization, geopolitics, economics, or something
else; and the question how such a division might be
avoided. Much will depend on how NATO (and per-
haps the EU) handles the enlargement that seems to
be 'in the cards', and how Russia responds to this.
In any case, what has been called the bipolar
'overlay' has been lifted, hence conflicts are no
longer (exogenously) predetermined by the oppos-
ing sides belonging to different 'camps', but the over-
whelming majority are endogenous. As a result, vari-
ous conflicts that lay dormant during the Cold War
have been rekindled, and (what appear to be) new
types of conflicts have erupted.
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An example of a 'rekindled conflict' is that
between Greece and Turkey that was previously sup-
pressed by their joint membership of NATO (vide
infra). Examples of 'new conflicts' are those on the
territory of the former Yugoslavia and of the former
Soviet Union-all of which would formerly have been
categorized as 'intra-state wars', even though some
have been transformed into international wars by the
international community's recognition of the seces-
sionist entities as states.
While there have been no 'hot' international
wars in Europe since the end of the Cold War, some
are at least conceivable, to which I shall return
shortly. However, there is little doubt that Europe
will experience the same development as has the rest
of the world, namely the rise to prominence of intra-
state wars-probably even more so than elsewhere,
because Europe has already experienced a period of
'long peace' (John Lewis Gaddis). This has been
attributed to a wide range of factors, for instance to
the war preventing effects of nuclear weapons, to
bipolarity, and to the pacifying role of institutions
such as NATO and the EU.
A few authors have thus predicted a return to
the 19th century patterns of shifting alignments and
occasional wars as a result of the disappearance, or
at least the receding saliency, of some of these fac-
tors. Others, however, have pointed to the persistence
of other war-inhibiting factors such as democracy
and market economy as well as to a general war-
weariness. Even without bipolarity and almost with-
out nuclear weapons it appears highly unlikely that,
say, France and Germany should end up a war with
each other once again; and even more inconceivable
that other 'old' and stable European states should go
to war against each other.
The 'old Europe' is thus firmly within what
has aptly been called 'the zone of peace' , which might
be taken as implying that neither arms control nor
defensive restructuring of the armed forces will have
much of a role to play. In the following, I shall nev-
ertheless venture some suggestions as to where they
might still be relevant as well as to what kind of
measures might be needed.
International Conflicts
Most of Europe is undoubtedly a zone of
peace, i.e. a security community among the mem-
bers of which war has ceased to be regarded as an
option. The 'zone of turmoil' ,however, commences
at the very fringes of the continent (or within the
peripheral parts of the continent, depending on where
one locates its outer limit), whence it may well spill
over into Europe.
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Even though this is primarily a question of
civil war (vide infra), there are also a residual risk of
international conflicts. The following is a list of con-
flicts that might conceivably lead to war. In none of
these cases is war the most likely outcome, but nei-
ther is it quite unlikely enough to render planning
and preparations for such an eventuality obviously
superfluous. Moreover, it is entirely conceivable that
the very planning might trigger chain reactions that
might present 'path to war'.
First of all, we have various conflicts related
to the break-up of the USSR, some of which are about
territorial issues, and most of which are located in
Russia's 'near abroad':
* between Russia and Ukraine, e.g. over the Crimea
or some other issue;
* between Russia and other states in its 'near abroad',
e.g. the Baltic states, perhaps triggered by secession-
ist attempts on the part of the Russian minorities;
* between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-
Karabakh;
* between Russia and (an enlarged) NATO;
* between Russia and Turkey over 'spheres of influ-
ence' in Central Asia and the Caucasus
Secondly, there are various potential wars re-
lated to the break-up of Yugoslavia:
* between Croatia and Serbia (the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia), most likely triggered by a breakdown
of the 'Dayton Regime' (vide infra), leading either
the Bosnian Croats or Serbs, or both, to seek the sup-
port from their respective 'mother state';
* between Serbia and the (Croat-Muslim) Federa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, most likely via an
internationalisation of a struggle between the
Republica Srpska and the federation;
* between FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia) and Greece.
Thirdly, we have to reckon with the possibil-
ity of a war between Greece and Turkey, either via
intervention by either state (or both) in a rekindled
armed conflict in Cyprus, via a maritime dispute in
the Aegean Sea; or, finally, via the intervention by
either or both in one of the several conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia.
Various arms control measures might have a
benign impact on any of these conflicts, as might a
defensive restructuring of the armed forces. Such
measures would, needles to say, not resolve the un-
derlying conflicts, but they might make a resort to
military means less likely and certainly less destruc-
tive, if armed struggle should break out, for the simple
reason that if neither of the opposing sides is capable
of large-scale aggression, none will occur.
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Intra-State Conflicts
The distinction between intra-state and inter-
national conflicts is neither clear-cut nor 'natural'. First
of all, there may be a causal link between the two in
the sense that intra-state conflicts may become inter-
nationalized as the opposing sides draw external pow-
ers in for assistance. Secondly, as was the case for
most of the conflicts listed above, a conflict may start
out as a civil war only to be 'transsubstantiated' into
international one by a (sometimes rather arbitrary)
decision on the part ofthe world community to recog-
nize the secessionist party as a sovereign state. The
same may happen to some of those on the following,
far from exhaustive, list of what remain, at the time of
writing, actual or potential armed intra-state conflicts.
* civil war between Moldova and the secessionist
'Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic';
* civil war between Georgia and the secessionist re-
gions Abkhazia and South Ossetia;
* civil war between Azerabijan and Nagorno-
Karabakh;
* civil war in Chechnya between the Russian Fed-
eration and the secessionists;
* civil war between the Federation and the Republica
Srpska within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
which would de facto be an international war, yet de
jure remain a civil, intra-state war;
* civil war in Albania;
* civil war between Turkey and the Kurds.
All such civil wars are extremely complex, and
the experience with conflict management and reso-
lution has not really been properly digested. Further-
more, neither traditional arms control theory nor
NOD theory has much to say about the issue. Rather
than generalising, I shall therefore confine myself to
a few suggestions pertaining to concrete conflicts,
some of which may be applicable to similar conflicts,
while others may not.
Arms Control and Defence Restructuring
for the Balkans
In the following I shall suggest some relevant
arms control and restructuring measures for three of
the conflicts in the Balkan area mentioned above: a
rather traditional international conflict (Greece ver-
sus Turkey), an entirely internal one (Albania) and
one exhibiting features from both, namely that in
Bosnia Herzegovina.
Greece versus Turkey
The conflict between Greece and Turkey is in
one sense a classical, old-fashioned conflict over ter-
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ritorial and other issues, which presently takes the
form of an arms race and occasional small armed
clashes. Whether it will ever flare up into a full-
fledged 'hot' war is an open question, the answer to
which hinges, among other things, on NATO's con-
tinuing ability to function as an embryonic collec-
tive security organization, besides its traditional role
of collective defence. If the conflict does erupt into
war, however, it could well get nasty, as both sides
have been rearming very heavily over the last few
years, inter alia because of the availability ofplenti-
ful and cheap supplies of equipment from other
NATO countries that has been 'cascaded' to the
flanks of the alliance in order to escape destruction
under CFE rules.
Imports of major conventional weapons
(SIPRI Yearbook 1996, TURKEY GREECE







Various arms control and restructuring mea-
sures would be relevant for preventing a war andlor,
if that fails, for containing it both 'horizontally', i.e.
for preventing it from escalating and from spread-
mg.
A relevant guide-line would be to ensure each
side's ability to defend itself against an attack from
the respective other. This situation of 'mutual de-
fensive superiority' is captured in the following
(pseudo-mathematical) formula, where D and 0 stand
for defensive and offensive strength, G and T for
Turkey, and where> signifies superiority.
Formula 1: DG> OT & DT > OG
The situation is, however, complicated by the
fact that the situation is profoundly multipolar and
open-ended, as Turkey would also need the ability
to defend itself against (or even attack) other
neighbours, many of which are not obviously peace-
ful: Iraq, Iran, and Syria as well as the unstable Cen-
tral Asian states. It is further complicated by the fact
that (as a result of the archipelagic nature) Greek
and Turkish borders in the Aegean Sea intersect
(which is one of the least unlikely causes of a war),
hence that it will be very difficult to device force
configurations and deployments that provide neither
side with border-crossing capabilities. What might
nevertheless help would be the following measures:
* A freeze on arms transfers to both states, with the
exception of such equipment as cannot be used for
cross-border attack. As far as Turkey is concerned,
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this would also improve the security of Russia and
Iraq.
* A regional (bilateral or, even better, multilateral)
Prevention of Incidents at Sea agreement.
* Various maritime CBMs applying to the Aegean
Sea.
* Limitations on amphibious vessels and other means
of seaward attack against land targets.
* Limitations on aircraft, especially for ground at-
tack.
A credible commitment on the part of NATO
to assist the victim of aggression, regardless of who
this might be, against the attacker (even though this
would be a NATO ally) would further help, as it
would modify the above formula into the following,
where N stands for NATO:
Formula 2: DG +DN > OT & DT +DN > OG
Bosnia-Herzegovina
The Bosnian situation is, in a certain sense, at
least equally complicated, inter alia because of the
'unorthodox' nature of the confederation and its con-
stituent entities, both territorially and otherwise; and,
of course, because of the all too vivid memories of
the recent war. In another sense, however, the situa-
tion is simpler:
The Dayton Agreement of 14 December 1995
stipulated not only the borders and political arrange-
ments of the 'new' state, but also the military ar-
rangements pertaining to it; and it provided for in-
ternational supervision of the agreement in the form
of IFOR and its successor SFOR, both operating
under UN authority, even though the operational
command is subdelegated to NATO. In Appendix 1B
on' Agreement on Regional Stabilization', it was thus
stipulated that
The parties agree that establishment of pro-
gressive measures for regional stability and arms
control is essential to creating a stable peace in the
region. To this end, they agree on the importance of
devising new forms of cooperation in the field of
security aimed at building transparency and confi-
dence and achieving balanced and stable defense
force levels at the lowest numbers consistent with
the Parties' respective security and the need to avoid
an arms race in the region. (Art. I)
It was further stipulated that such measures
would include
(a) restrictions on military deployments and
exercises in certain geographical areas; (b) restraints
on the re-introduction of foreign forces (...) (c) re-
strictions on locations of heavy weapons; (d) with-
drawal of forces and heavy weapons to cantonment!
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barracks areas or other designated locations (oo.) (f)
notification of certain planned military activities,
including international military assistance and train-
ing programs; (g) identification of and monitoring
of weapons manufacturing capabilities; (h) immedi-
ate exchange of data on the holdings of the five Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (hereinaf-
ter "CFE") weapons categories as defined in the CFE
Treaty (Art. II)
These stipulations certainly seem to indicate
a continued relevance of arms control; indeed, they
even seem to partly vindicate some of the central
tenets of NOD theory. A relevant guide-line might
thus be the formula of stability via mutual defensive
superiority mentioned above, albeit in a slightly more
complex version. Formula 3 describes a stable 'bal-
ance of power' in Bosnia, with F standing for the
Federation, RS for the Republica Srpska, BH for
Bosnia- Herzegovina.
Formula 3: OF> ORS & DRS > OF
One may describe the preconditions for sta-
bility in the former Yugoslavia as a whole in similar
terms. The following formulae, however, presuppose
that the defensive strength of Bosnia-Herzegovina
is at least equal to the combined defensive strength
of its constituent entities-which is far from certain.
Formula 4: OF + DRS . DBH
Formula 5 describes stability among the three
main states in the former Yugoslavia, with C stand-
ing for Croatia and S for Serbia, and taking into ac-
count that either two of them might 'gang up' against
the third, as in other multipolar systems:
Formula 5a: DBH> OS + OC
Formula 5b: OS> OBH + OC
Formula 5c: DC> OBH + OS
The above formulae describe demanding, yet
not necessarily prohibitive, requirements for defen-
sive restructuring by means of arms control or uni-
lateral steps. Moreover, the addition of the factor of
external assistance (E), e.g. in the shape of SFOR,
would only make the achievement of stability easier,
as this force would (it seems safe to assume) always
strengthen the defender against the aggressor, who-
ever may be cast in which role.
Applied to the situation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the above formula 3 would be amended
as in formula 6:
Formula 6a: OF + E > ORS & DRS + E > OF
Formula 7a-c described the stabilizing effects
of an external 'balancer' to the multipolar conflict
between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina that
was captured above in formulae 5a-c:
Formula 7a: DBH + E > OS + OC
Formula 7b: OS + E > OBH + OC
Formula 7c: DC + E> OBH + OS
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There are various proposals for how to fur-
ther stabilize the situation in concrete terms, includ-
ing a set of detailed proposals by Hans Dieter Lemke
of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in
Ebenhausen, Germany; a concrete arms control pro-
posal to accompany the Dayton Agreement written
by US ambassador (ret.) Jonathan Dean; and an
elaborate proposal for defensive restructuring pro-
duced jointly by the Project Defense Alternative and
the Study Group Alternative Security Policy. It is,
however, beyond the scope of the present paper to
go into any detail. Suffice it to touch upon one con-
troversial issue with regard to the application of NOD
to the former Yugoslavia: that of militias.
While the defence structure of Yugoslavia was
presented by certain NOD advocates as a close real-
life approximation to the NOD ideals, it has been
argued by others that the debacle resulting from the
breakup ofthe Yugoslav federation has compromised
the concept of NOD as such. First of all, however,
the notion of militias is not intrinsic to NOD as such,
but merely one way of fielding armed forces that
would be strictly defensive. There are other person-
nel structures which may be more appropriate for
certain countries, and which may be equally defen-
sive. Secondly, the experience with militias in ex-
Yugoslavia was neither a complete failure nor a recipe
for highly destructive war. In fact, the Slovene mili-
tia-like forces performed quite well against the regu-
lar forces of rest-Yugoslavia. Be that as it may, to
suggest a militia-based defence, e.g. along the Swiss
example where guns are kept at home, would obvi-
ously be very ill-advised in countries such as those
in the former Yugoslavia; but this is no argument at
all against designing forces to be as defensive and
incapable of attacking neighbouring states or 'enti-
ties' as possible.
Albania
The almost surreal turmoil in Albania in the
Spring of 1997, spurred by the collapse of the infa-
mous 'pyramid schemes' , may not even deserve the
label 'civil war', which suggest something orderly.
On the other hand, it bears a certain resemblance to
the situation in Liberia, Somalia and Afghanistan and
other cases of 'failed states'. Some have, moreover,
argued that this is the most likely future type of con-
flict under 'the coming anarchy': a rest to a
Hobbesian 'bellum omnium contra omens '.
In such cases, there is probably not much that
arms control in the traditional sense can accomplish.
It is not so much a question of regulating arms as of
disarming as many civilians as possible as quickly
as possible. The rationale for this is to preventing
The Italian Ost-Politik
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(or perhaps rather reversing) a 'privatization of se-
curity', where the state has ceased to provide do-
mestic security and the citizens hence have taken 'the
law' in their own hands, most often in the form of
hand-guns.
Conclusion
We have thus seen that while some Cold War
arms control schemes have been rendered obviously
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irrelevant by the end of the Cold War, there is still a
role to play for arms control and defence restructur-
ing in the new Europe. The purpose would be the
traditional one of arms control, namely to prevent
wars, both international and intra-state, and to limit
their destructiveness, should they nevertheless oc-
cur. As Mark Twain might have put it, 'the rum ours
of the irrelevance of arms control and NOD are much
exaggerated' . •
Viktor Tadi6
Since about the beginning of the year the
phrase "eastern policy" or Ost-Politik has been ap-
pearing with more and more frequency in the Italian
media. It relatively quickly entered the political vo-
cabulary of Farnesina (Italian foreign affairs minis-
try), while those in the know observe that it was
invented by the current under-secretary in the same
ministry, Piero Fassino. The phrase both conceptu-
ally and verbally depicts the Italian political initia-
tive, the new political course that, as a Mediterra-
nean regional power, it is projecting towards the
countries in ex-Yugoslavia, to Slovenia and Croatia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia and Macedonia,
as well as Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria and from
there to the countries of the ex-USSR.
The rise of
the Italian "eastern policy"
"An Italian eastern policy really does exist".
This was expressly confirmed by Fassino himself in
the middle of January this year. At a time when
Belgrade was alight with demonstrations against
Milosevic, Fassino stated that the winds that were
blowing through the Balkans, thinking mainly of
Serbia, showed to what extent central and south east
Europe was crucial for the future of the whole of the
continent. The creation of a new security architec-
ture in the Balkan region had its own focus, for by
the end of the century the EU and NATO would
spread towards that region. In this context, in
Fassino's opinion, key topics in this part of Europe,
like for example immigration and the fight against.
international crime, would also lead to the necessity
for Italy to have closer ties with the countries of cen-
tral and eastern Europe. Fassino also mentioned the
interdependence of Italy and the countries of central
and eastern Europe, the long-standing cultural links
and the very considerable political relations, par-
ticularly in recent times, between Italy and some of
the countries of this region, all of which suggests
the need for closer collaboration in both economics
and culture. It gets stressed that in the countries of
the central and eastern region, Italy is the second
most important trading partner, and that it is the num-
ber one partner for Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria,
Macedonia and Albania. In this context the Foreign
Report of the respected London weekly The Econo-
mist had a headline at the beginning of November
last year that ran "The surprising Italians", referring
to the initiatives of Italian foreign politics with re-
spect to central and eastern Europe.
